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I. Executive Summary  
Rapid economic development in China has led to a significant increase in the number of 
buildings and building energy usage. According to ASHRAE, buildings in China account for 
approximately 25% of total energy use and its share is expected to increase as urbanization 
persists (Zhou et al, 2014, p. 26). Given the growing emphasis on sustainability, China has 
committed to the United Nations that it will aim to cut its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per 
unit of gross domestic product by 60-65% from 2005 levels (Xinhua, 2015, p. 1). Many of the 
policies that China has devised to reach this goal pertain to carbon reductions in the building 
sector. Numerous researches have been done on individual policies that target building carbon or 
energy reductions such as new building design standards, building retrofit demonstration projects 
and incentives, and emissions trading systems (ETSs). Few studies, however, have discussed the 
impact or effectiveness of these policy categories in relation to each other. As such, this research 
is intended as a comprehensive, coherent study on the building sector’s carbon reduction 
performance under the influence of related policies and mechanisms, with a specific focus on 
emissions trading. 
Carbon trading has served as an effective mechanism to curb carbon emissions in many countries. 
As one of the largest carbon emitters in the world, China started experimenting with carbon 
trading since 2011 by implementing local carbon trading in major cities and provinces as part of 
the “Two Provinces and Five Cities” plan.  The ultimate research question that this paper 
explores is: Has emissions trading been effective in promoting energy and carbon reductions in 
the building sector in China? What features of program design or other policies would enhance 
the building sector’s overall energy efficiency? In answering this question, this study will 
provide an overview of the building stock in China, analyze historical trade data for local ETSs 




in China that involve building participants, compare the results with those of ETSs that involve 
buildings, and discuss other policy mechanisms that can complement emissions trading systems 
in promoting energy and associated carbon reductions in buildings in China. Findings of this 
paper preliminarily conclude that emissions trading has the potential to induce initial energy 
reductions in buildings, and its long-term impact on building energy efficiency can be further 
enhanced if combined with other policy mechanisms that provide tools and resources for relevant 
stakeholders to undertake deeper retrofits for their facilities. 
  




II. Literature Review 
Overview of China’s Building Stock and Energy-Related Policies 
Buildings are a significant source of energy consumption in China. Some scholars estimated that 
total lifecycle building energy consumption accounts for nearly 45% of the country’s total annual 
energy consumption and carbon emissions, with 25% from the construction phase and 20% from 
the operational phase (Fu et al, 2013, p. 316). One study found that the total floor area in China 
more than doubled between 2000 and 2008 as a result of urbanization and is projected to triple 
by 2030 (Amecke et al, 2013, p. 9). Over half of the existing floor area is rural residential 
buildings, and urban residential and commercial spaces constitute approximately 27% and 17% 
of the floor area, respectively. Energy expenses are paid by tenants (or owners of residential 
units) for residential buildings and by property owners or property management companies for 
commercial buildings. 
Despite the low average building energy consumption per capita and energy intensity (Btu/sq-ft) 
in China compared to those in developed nations, it is projected to grow rapidly for two reasons 
(Shenzhen City Development Research Center, 2015, p. 5). First, economic growth and 
urbanization are expected to continue, which would result in an increase in living standards and 
associated increase in energy consumption per capita. Second, the operation of most of the 
buildings in China involves periodic shut-down of energy-consuming equipment at certain times 
of the day and for different building areas (Amecke et al, 2013, p. 11). If the building operation 
patterns evolve and start resembling those in developed nations—where space is automatically 
conditioned all the time—overall energy consumption and energy intensity of the building sector 
will increase considerably. Given the building sector’s significant contribution to the overall 




energy consumption of the nation, policies that regulate buildings’ energy usage are an essential 
factor for controlling and reducing China’s overall carbon emissions.  
The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) of China issued energy 
codes for new buildings in the 1990s and has been updating them since. There are codes for both 
public and residential buildings. The public building codes pertain to design standards for public 
buildings throughout China that are categorized as new construction, construction expansion, or 
building renovation. The energy consumption in new and refurbished public buildings 
implemented after the energy code release needs to be reduced by 50% compared to that in 
1980s. These design standards address energy-related construction processes or system features 
and, to some extent, energy management strategies (MOHURD, 2005, p. 9). Use of materials or 
systems such as the building envelope needs to meet certain thresholds (e.g. heat transfer 
coefficients), and energy management practices include seasonal temperature set points amongst 
other adjustments building occupants can control. Similarly, the residential building codes 
contain three types of design standards, each targeting a different climate zone (MOHURD, 2008 
& 2010).  
While the policy is largely defined and supervised by the MOHURD at the national level, 
implementation is carried out by provinces and municipalities and extent of compliance may 
vary by region. In fact, provinces municipalities can develop more stringent commercial and 
residential building codes of their own. For example, Beijing and Tianjin have developed and 
executed standards that are roughly 10-15% more efficient than the national counterparts (Feng 
et al, 2015, p. 2). Noncompliance by finished projects is subject to penalties including revocation 
of licenses, imposition of fines, and requirements to rectify the noncompliant components of 
buildings. While evidence shows that compliance rates have constantly improved and held 




steady at > 93% over the last 15 years, compliance in smaller cities could be low given a lack of 
knowledge and expertise of the local enforcement entities (Feng et al, 2015, p. 4).    
Other policies exist to promote energy-efficient new buildings in China. According to a GBPN 
(2012) report, China began to establish its system of building energy efficiency labeling and 
evaluation in 2006, which the MOHURD began promoting in pilot projects that involve newly 
built government office buildings and large-sized public buildings since 2009 (Bin et al, 2012, p. 
11). Similarly, China established green building labeling programs for both the design and 
operational stages of buildings, and over 270 buildings were awarded with green building 
evaluation labels to date. 
Unlike new buildings, existing buildings are not subject to energy code compliance. China has 
undertaken several initiatives, however, to target energy reductions in existing buildings. A study 
conducted by the Climate Policy Initiative (2013) summarized initiatives in which buildings can 
participate. Such initiatives include: (1) a voluntary appliance energy efficiency labeling program 
covering over 40 products including water-saving products (Zhou, 2008, p. 1), which is similar 
to Energy Star in the United States; (2) incentives promoting energy efficiency or renewable 
energy measures, including corporate income tax incentives and fiscal incentives for 
implementation of pilot projects; (3) subsidies for energy-efficient appliances, energy service 
companies (ESCOs), and district heating retrofit or reform programs; (4) an array of financing 
mechanisms that promote retrofit projects in the residential and government sectors; and (5) pilot 
emissions trading programs, which are the focus of this paper (Feng et al, 2015, p. 12). 




Emissions Trading Systems in China 
Carbon trading has served as an effective mechanism of curbing carbon emissions in many 
countries. Many of the existing emissions trading systems are cap-and-trade programs where the 
regulators set a decreasing cap on the total amount of carbon emissions allowed in a particular 
year (i.e., allowances) and allocates these allowances to regulated entities based on a multitude 
of factors including historical emissions levels, projected production, and auctioning. As one of 
the largest carbon emitters in the world, China started experimenting with carbon trading in 2011 
in major cities and provinces covering Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chongqing, 
Guangdong Province, and Hubei Province. Unlike ETSs in other countries, these pilot programs 
target carbon emissions reductions based on energy intensity reduction instead of a total cap. The 
energy-intensity approach was chosen largely due to considerations of future economic 
development and associated potential increase in total carbon emissions. Four of the pilots—
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Shenzhen—involve buildings (Qi et al, 2015, p. 11). The nature 
and extent of involvement of the building sector, however, varies by program.  
Beijing’s ETS covered 543 business entities including public buildings with direct or indirect 
emissions of at least 10,000 tons of CO2 annually. Starting 2016, Beijing’s ETS coverage 
expanded to include mobile emissions sources such as railway transportation and electric buses 
(China Beijing Environment Exchange, 2016, p. 12). Beijing also allowed trading of Chinese 
Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) up to 5% of the amount of allowance surrender for a 
particular year. CCERs are the product of eligible offsets, which in Beijing include forest 
restoration and energy performance contracting projects in the city as well as hydroelectric and 
non-industrial gas projects in other regions.  




It is worth noting that energy performance contracting (EPC) projects typically involve building 
energy efficiency retrofits, which implies that the building sector can participate as regulated 
entities or offset sources in Beijing’s ETS. In addition, public buildings are not the only 
regulated buildings in Beijing’s ETS. Regulated entities include property management 
companies and real estate companies, which trade allowances at the entity level but likely curb 
carbon emissions at the building level (National Energy Administration, 2014, p. 1).  
Shanghai’s ETS covered approximately 190 industrial facilities emitting 20,000 tons of CO2 and 
service sector entities emitting 10,000 tons CO2 annually including shopping malls and hotels, 
and commercial buildings. The Shanghai ETS covers the following entities involving buildings 
(Shanghai Municipal Development & Reform Commission, 2016, p. 1):  
Entity Name Type of Facility 
Shanghai Pudong District Shangri-La Hotel Ltd. Hotel 
Shanghai Jinjiang Oriental Hotel Ltd. Hotel 
Jing’an Hilton Hotel (Shanghai) Hotel 
Shanghai Tomorrow Square Co., Ltd. Shopping Mall 
Shanghai Everbright Convention & Exhibition Center Co., Ltd. Exhibition Center 
Shanghai SIIC  South Pacific Hotels Ltd. Shanghai Four Seasons Hotel  Hotel 
First Shanghai Yaohan Co., Ltd. (Yaohan) Shopping Mall 
Shanghai New World Co., Ltd. (New World City) Shopping Mall 
Shanghai Pacific Department Store Co., Ltd. (Xujiahui) Shopping Mall 
Shanhgai Jiu Guang Department Store Co., Ltd. (Jiubai City Square) Shopping Mall 
Shanghai Long Dream Shopping Mall Management Co., Ltd. (Zhongshan Park) Shopping Mall 
Grand Gateway Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. (Grand Gateway Plaza) Realty 
Shanghai Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. (Constant State Plaza) Realty 
Shanghai’s ETS is unique in several aspects. While other pilot ETSs employ a two-year 
compliance period, Shanghai’s ETS employs a three-year compliance period. In addition, 
Shanghai’s compliance rate is 100% in both 2014 and 2015, a record unmatched by the other 
three pilot programs involving buildings (Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange, 2016, p. 
4). Lastly, while Shanghai restricted CCER use to 5% of an entity’s compliance obligation just 




like Beijing, it embraces CCERs generated in other regions. According to the report by Shanghai 
Environment and Energy Exchange (SEEE), Shanghai’s CCER trade volume in 2015 constitutes 
74% of the total CCER trade volume in the nation (SEEE, 2016, p. 6). Since more granular trade 
data is not available, it is hard to discern the building sector’s reliance on CCERs versus 
allowances for compliance. The 100% compliance rate in two consecutive years, however, 
implies that the building sector is capable of emissions reductions in a medium-length 
compliance period. 
Shenzhen’s ETS covered 635 businesses and 197 buildings, which include government-owned, 
commercial, multi-use, shopping malls, and restaurant buildings. The ETS covers 40% of the 
city’s total carbon emissions in the manufacturing, electricity generation, and building sectors 
(Shen et al, 2014, p. 564). The city government targeted the building sector for it consumes 23% 
of the total energy used by the city and 43% of the city’s total electricity supply (Shenzhen City 
Development Research Center, 2015, p. 5). Unlike other regions in China, the energy intensity of 
buildings in Shenzhen is three times as high as the average building energy intensity in 
developed countries. The Shenzhen ETS sets a precedent in that it is the first ETS in the world to 
experiment with allowance allocation by benchmarking before the compliance period (Jiang et al, 
2014, p. 19). The covered public buildings, however, are exempt from such allowance allocation 
method and receive 100% of their allowances for free during the current compliance period. 
According to 2014 statistics, 99.4% of the 635 regulated entities have met their energy intensity 
reduction goals (Shenzhen City Development Research Center, 2015, p. 27). Note, however, that 
building participants were incorporated in the ETS for experimentation only to date and their 
compliance status is not reflected in the overall compliance rate (Shenzhen Institute of Building 
Research, 2014, p. 43). 




Tianjin pursued a different route for reducing carbon emissions of the building sector. Instead of 
directly requiring buildings to surrender allowances, it created a sub-platform within the ETS for 
energy efficiency trading. According to its registration and record management methods (2010), 
property management companies, energy service companies, heat suppliers, private building 
owners are eligible to participate in trading. If a registered private property exceeds Tianjin’s 
energy efficiency standards, the amount of energy avoided or saved can be converted to 
equivalent carbon emissions reductions and then traded in the typical ETS (Tianjin Municipal 
Government, 2010, p. 1). Both new and existing buildings can participate in trading as long as 
they can demonstrate below-the-standard energy intensity. For existing buildings, carbon 
emissions are typically reduced as a result of retrofit projects. 
The energy efficiency trading platform in Tianjin is not only a beneficiary of retrofit projects but 
also helps facilitate retrofit projects such as energy performance contracts. For example, Tianjin 
Climate Exchange (TCE) entered into an energy performance contract in December 2009 with 
PetroChina, a Chinese oil and gas company, and an energy service company (Wang, 2012, p. 6). 
This contract specifies that the quantity of carbon reductions associated with the guaranteed 
energy savings from the energy performance contract will be traded on TCE. Therefore, Tianjin 
has explored innovative ways of incorporating the building sector into the carbon trading system. 
The compliance rate has been relatively high across all four ETS pilots and increased between 
2013 and 2014 (Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange, 2016, p. 4): 
Program Location Compliance Rate for 2013 Compliance Rate for 2014 
Beijing 97.1% 100% 
Shanghai 100% 100% 
Shenzhen 99.4% 99.7% 
Tianjin 96.5% 99.1% 




All four ETS pilots allow the use of CCERs toward compliance. CCERs can fulfill up to 5-10% 
of an entity’s compliance obligation; wind energy, hydroelectric energy, and methane gas use in 
rural areas constitute the majority of the CCER projects to date (Partnership for Market 
Readiness, 2016, p. 7). Building energy efficiency upgrades contributed little to the audited 
CCER project types, and Beijing’s ETS is the only pilot that accepts energy efficiency credits in 
addition to allowance and CCERs. As discussed, Tianjin’s case is unique as energy reduction 
credits from the building sector are traded as allowance equivalent rather than a separate trading 
commodity. 
Since facility-specific trade data is not available for any of the four programs, it is difficult to 
track the compliance rate of the building sector in these pilots or the breakdown among 
allowances surrendered, voluntary carbon reductions through retrofits, and CCERs purchased by 
regulated facilities. Since quantitative data is insufficient for analysis, a comparative analysis 








III. Research Method 
This study will compare and contrast major ETSs in the world that regulate buildings. 
Specifically, it will analyze key program features, historical trade data, carbon reduction goals, 
and compliance rates across the emissions trading systems. To better understand whether 
emissions trading has driven building energy reductions, carbon prices will be evaluated against 
building retrofit costs among other factors that may influence the decision between self-reduction 
and allowance purchase toward compliance. In addition, this paper will review other building 
policies implemented in these regions to better understand their impact on building energy 
efficiency compared to that of emissions trading. 
Data collection focused on public, commercial, and residential buildings in the urban setting. 
While more than half of the floor area in China is located in the rural area, rural buildings’ 
energy consumption is often not clearly tracked or documented. Furthermore, persistent 
urbanization might indirectly stall the increase of energy consumption of rural buildings. Lastly, 
energy efficiency improvements are also more likely to occur in urban settings than in rural 
settings. Therefore, a focus on buildings in the urban area can provide valuable insight into the 
overall trend of building sector’s energy use in China.  
  




IV. Data Analysis 
Two other regions in the world directly regulate the building sector’s GHG emissions through 
emissions trading: Tokyo and Saitama, Japan (Kossoy, 2014, p. 52). On the other hand, some 
other ETSs regulate the building sector indirectly. That is, they regulate entities that supply fuel 
to buildings (e.g., the power sector). California’s ETS is such an example and, unlike others, it 
explicitly targets the commercial and residential sectors through indirect regulation starting 2015. 
Since the Tokyo and Saitama program designs are similar, only Tokyo’s ETS will be discussed 
along with California’s ETS. Both programs will be analyzed to determine the effectiveness of 
distinct program designs in curbing building energy use and derive factors that should be 
considered to enhance engagement of the building sector in ETSs in China. 
Tokyo ETS 
According to a report by the Bureau of Environment of Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG), 
the residential and commercial building sectors’ contribution to Tokyo’s carbon emissions has 
steadily increased from 52.8% in 1990 to 64% in 2007 (Nishida, Unknown, p. 5). Given the 
significance of the building sector to both the economy and energy usage, TMG issued two 
policy initiatives that target the building sector. The Green Building Program was introduced in 
2002 and requires newly built or expanded buildings whose total floor area exceeds 5,000 square 
meters (approximately 54,000 square feet) to submit their building environment plans (Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government Bureau of Environment, 2014, p. 1). The program was amended in 
2010 to encourage the installation of renewable energy technologies. A study by TMG revealed 
that the Green Building Program covers about 40% of new buildings in Tokyo. Two related 
resources are the Green Labeling Program for Condominiums issued in 2005 and the Energy 
Performance Certificate Program launched in 2009, both of which provide tools for evaluating 




the different aspects of building energy usage for different building types (Nishida, Unknown, p. 
8). 
The other initiative, the mandatory reporting and cap and trade program for existing buildings, 
was launched in 2010. Tokyo’s ETS is the world’s first urban cap and trade program that covers 
and targets buildings (MOHURD, 2013, p. 7). Facilities with annual energy consumption of 
crude oil equivalent of 1,500 kiloliters or more are regulated under the program (Environmental 
Defense Fund, 2015, p. 1). The program covers approximately 40% of the commercial & 
industrial sectors’ emissions, or approximately 1,350 facilities including offices, commercial 
facilities, lodging, educational facilities, medical facilities, and distribution centers. The total 
reduction goal for the program is 25% CO2 reductions below the 2000 levels by 2020, and the 
base-year emissions were calculated using the average emissions of freely selected three 
consecutive fiscal years in FY2002-FY2007 (Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of 
Environment, 2012, p. 19). Specifically, there are two five-year compliance periods, and the CO2 
reduction goal for the first compliance period (2010-2014) was 8% for business facilities and 6% 
for industrial facilities. During the second compliance period (2015-2019), the reduction 
obligations increase to 17% for business facilities and 15% for industrial facilities.  
The program seems relatively successful based on the performance data from the past five years. 
Below is a summary of the compliance data published by TMG (Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government Bureau of Environment, 2012-2016): 










Base Year Emissions  
(t-CO2) 
13,627,000 
Actual Emissions  
(t-CO2) 
11,824,000 10,595,000 10,636,000 10,530,000 10,267,000 




Reduction from Base 
Year (%) 
13% 22% 22% 23% 25% 
Covered Facilities 1,348 1,392 1,325 1,232 Not Reported 
GHG Reports Filed 1,159 934 1,302 1,221 Not Reported 
Reporting Rate* (%) 86.0% 67.1% 98.3% 99.1% N/A 
Reported Compliance 
Rate (%) 
64% 93% 92% 90% Not Reported 
*Reporting facilities are inclusive of compliance facilities. 
 
There are a few highlights of the report. First, the number of covered facilities fluctuated from 
year to year. This is reasonable given that the number of facilities that meet the compliance 
criteria can change, but this approach may result in inconsistent baselines to track reductions. In 
addition, emissions from buildings that were previously regulated but were no longer required to 
report GHG emissions in subsequent years could not be tracked, and it is unclear whether they 
contribute to the 25% reduction goal of the ETS. Second, the reporting rate is calculated as the 
percentage of covered facilities that submitted GHG emissions reports on time and whose 
emissions have been verified before TMG publishes its annual reports. If additional reports were 
submitted after the TMG official report release, the overall reporting rate would be higher than 
provided in the table.  
The third key observation is that the CO2 reductions were not entirely attributed to covered 
facilities’ active pursuits of energy efficiency improvements. While the 13% reduction in the 1st 
year of the program is said to be the result of active energy-saving upgrades undertaken by 
covered facilities, the additional 9% reduction in the 2nd year was largely triggered by the power 
crisis and the Great East Japan Earthquake (Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of 
Environment, 2013, p. 1). In fact, the total emissions reduction between FY2011 and FY2012 
was negative; so was the average reduction per reporting facility between FY2012 and FY2013. 
The annual CO2 emissions level also consistently stayed at approximately 10 million tons of CO2 




between FY 2011 and FY2014, which implies that the covered facilities might have reached a 
bottleneck in further emissions reduction. Below is list of reduction measures summarized by 





Key Energy-saving Measures 
External Factors that 
Influenced GHG Emissions 
1st Year 
(FY2010) 
HVAC, lighting, management of heat source, 
management of hot water supply systems, 




Temperature set point adjustments and LED 
installations.  
Power Crisis 
Great East Japan Earthquake 
3rd Year 
(FY2012) 
LEDs, high-efficiency HVAC equipment, 
high-efficiency heat source equipment, high-
efficiency pumps and fans 
Note: Reduction measures implemented after 
the earthquake and power crisis in FY2011 
were relaxed as they were seen as 




Continuation of post-crisis reduction 
measures, introduction of energy service 





Continuation of post-crisis reduction 
measures, cooperation with tenants in 
reducing energy demands, enhanced 
awareness, and assignment of eco-managers. 
N/A 
 
Carbon prices may provide hints on whether the ETS can drive emissions reductions in the long 
run. Facilities are allocated emission allowances according to their base year emissions. To 
comply with the program, they need to either reduce emissions beyond allowance coverage or 
purchase offset credits for these “disallowed” emissions. There are five types of offset credits: 
excess emission reduction credits, small and midsize facility credits, renewable energy credits 
(RECs), outside Tokyo credits, and Saitama credits (IETA, 2015, p. 4). If allowances are not 
fully exhausted for a facility, the unused portion can be traded as excess credits and used by the 




end of the second compliance period. Participants can choose any combination of the credits and 
self-reduction for compliance. As of May 2015, approximately 570,000 tons of CO2 credits have 
been supplied or contracted for supply to the market, and the majority of participants purchased 
excess credits and RECs for compliance. While trading prices are not publicly available, a survey 
conducted by TMG found that RECs traded at $45-$54/tCO2 in October 2014 and excess credits 
traded at $36-$45/tCO2 (IETA, 2015, p. 8). The prices for both have been steadily declining 
since December 2011, when they were initially traded at $130-$160/tCO2.  
Despite a high carbon price compared to other ETSs in the world, trading constitutes a small 
percentage of the total allowance surrendered. Considering 3.36 million tons of CO2 reduction 
achieved to date, 570,000 tons of CO2 credit supply translates to 17% of the reduction. This 
indicates that regulated facilities primarily chose self-reduction to meet reduction goals. If self-
reduction reflects that energy retrofits are more cost effective than offset credit purchase, why 
aren’t participants incentivized to generate and sell excess credits as part of their retrofits for sale 
in the ETS? There are three possible explanations. First, based on the summary chart above, 
reduction measures mainly fall into three categories – lighting upgrades, equipment replacement, 
and occupant engagement to reduce demand or equipment operating hours. These upgrades can 
achieve sizable savings without necessarily requiring third-party services and thus incurring 
significant costs, which can explain that carbon prices were not needed to motivate the retrofits. 
Another force is the potential difficulty of registering and processing an offset credit in the ETS. 
Facilities are required to apply for certification to TMG before credits can be issued for sale in 
the ETS (IETA, 2015, p. 4). While the length and specific requirements of the application 
process are unknown, it typically involves two major steps—offset certification and 
documentation of credits under the Registry (TMG, 2014, p. 31). Lastly, unlimited banking 




across compliance periods may have encouraged retention of unused credits. Participants would 
behave more conservatively and thus retain excess credits generated from retrofits if it is allowed 
and future carbon prices remain unknown or are expected to rise.  
Tokyo’s program has achieved the 2020 reduction goal essentially five years ahead. Its seeming 
success to date can be partly attributed to good program design, which entails the following 
elements (Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Environment, 2012, p. 10-16):  
 Strict penalties for non-compliance: a penalty of up to 500,000 Yen and 1.3 times the 
amount of the shortage has to be reduced;  
 Clear definitions of key terms (i.e. what is considered a single facility and thus covered 
by the program); 
 Detailed program rules that address how changes in building conditions, ownership, and 
other aspects are handled; 
 Flexibility built into the five-year compliance period that offers facilities sufficient time 
to respond to unexpected changes in building use that might increase emissions; and 
 Flexibility built into the numerous means of compliance: self-reduction and five types of 
offset credits. 
Nonetheless, given limited trading activities and steady emissions of covered facilities during 
FY2011-FY2014, the extent of success of Tokyo’s ETS warrants further scrutiny. Early 
achievement of reduction goals could imply that the absolute cap was set too high (Rudolph, 
2012, p. 357). However, the program does seem capable of encouraging building retrofits and 
energy reductions. Trading might also become more active with further reduction requirements. 
Under a tightened cap for the second compliance period, further emissions reductions could be 
more challenging and require deep retrofits. Deeper retrofits, in turn, may be more costly than 




“low-hanging fruit” upgrades, and may rely more heavily on carbon prices to help offset the 
implementation costs. In addition, deeper retrofits may require more expertise than what building 
managers typically possess, which reinforce their costliness and potential reliance on carbon 
prices to partially offset the upfront cost. Overall, while it is premature to conclude that Tokyo’s 
ETS has been an evident success, it has stimulated some degree of self-reduction by building 
participants. To further the ETS’s impact on building energy efficiency, a strong carbon price 
signal, a more active trading floor, and building participants’ improved access to necessary 
resources to participate with confidence would be needed. 
California ETS 
California’s ETS was established in 2012 as a key component of complying with the Assembly 
Bill 32 (AB 32), a state law that requires the reduction of statewide GHG remissions to 1990 
levels by 2020 (Shen et al, 2014, p. 551). The trading scheme is expected to contribute to 22.5% 
of the expected total GHG emissions reduction under the Bill and the following complementary 
measures are expected to result in the remaining 77.5% of the total reduction: 1) a renewable 
portfolio standard targeting 50% power generation from renewables by 2030, 2) strengthening 
energy efficiency for buildings and appliances, 3) a Clean Vehicle Plan, 4) a Low Carbon 
Emission Fuel Standard, 5) refrigerant leakage reduction, and 6) forestry protection (Shen et al, 
2014, p. 554).  
California’s ETS covers about 350 businesses involving 600 facilities that account for 
approximately 85% of the state’s GHG emissions in 2011. The design of the trading scheme is 
summarized in the following graphics (Shen et al, 2014, p. 555): 
  






Reduction Goal (% below 
2012 emissions level) 
Covered Entities 
2013-2014 4% (2% annually) In-state electricity generation, power imports, and 
large stationary sources that emit >25,000 metric 
tons of CO2/yr 
2015-2017 9% (3% annually) All entities covered in the 1st period plus suppliers 
of fuels and other fuel combustion 
2018-2020 9% (3% annually) Same as the 2nd period 
 
Based on published compliance reports, emissions data is available for 258 entities in 2013 and 
263 entities in 2014. Only five university entities can be inferred to have buildings as some of 
their main assets. The compliance data for these five universities is summarized as below 
(California Air Resources Board, 2014-2015):  








Regents of the 
University of 
California 










113,984 113,984 0 Fulfilled 
California State 
University 
341,975 341,975 0 Fulfilled 
The Board of 
Trustees of the 
Leland Stanford 
Junior University 





A few conclusions can be drawn from the data. First, direct regulation of buildings constitutes a 
small portion of the covered entities. In fact, they only account for 0.77% or less of the total 
allowances to be surrendered in 2013 and 2014. In addition, compliance is evaluated at the entity 
instead of the facility level, which reduces the visibility into which entities include or deliver fuel 
to buildings and whether such buildings contributed to compliance through energy reductions. 




Unlike Tokyo’s ETS, California’s trading scheme is not necessarily designed to enforce 
emissions tracking at the facility level. In addition, many entities that supply energy to buildings 
may also supply energy to other types of constructs (e.g. industrial plants). Both factors make it 
difficult to quantify the building sector’s impact on overall compliance. Currently, the building 
sector’s indirect impact in the ETS could be limited as industrial facilities constitute a majority 
of the covered facilities. This is not surprising considering the composition of California’s GHG 
emissions. Out of the 459 million tons (Mt) of CO2 emissions in California in 2013, only 43.5 Mt 
came from the commercial and residential sector, or a 9.5% contribution (ICAP, 2016, p. 1). It is 
important to note, however, that the residential and commercial sectors are covered by the ETS 
starting 2015 (or the second compliance period), the compliance data for which is not available 
at the time this research is conducted (Bugnion, 2015, p. 6). Similar to the first compliance 
period, buildings do not directly participate in the ETS. Instead, facilities with more than 25,000 
tons of annual CO2 emission that supply natural gas or other types of fuel to buildings (among 
other end users) are directly regulated (ICAP, 2016, p. 2). At that time, more buildings’ footprint 
may be incorporated into the ETS and regulated at the source level, and it is possible to better 
understand the extent of energy reductions in buildings through the ETS depending on the types 
of data available in the near future.  




Comparative Analysis  
Below is a summary of major ETSs analyzed in this study that cover the building sector: 
 Beijing ETS Shanghai ETS Shenzhen ETS Tianjin ETS Tokyo ETS California ETS 
Compliance 
Period 
2 years 3 years 2 years 2 years 5 years 2 to 3 years 
Avg. Compliance 
Rate* 
98.55% 100% 99.55% 97.8% 87.63%** 99.9% 
Avg. # of 
Covered 
Entities/Facilities 
479 191 633 113 1,324 261 
Regulation Level Entity Entity Entity & Facility Entity Facility Entity 
Banking Allowed Yes (expires on 
June 30, 2016) 
Yes Yes Yes (expires on 


























Vast majority of 
participants are 







*All compliance rates refer to the overall compliance rates of covered entities/facilities, not the compliance rate of the building sector.  
**The compliance rate for the Tokyo ETS is estimated and the average calculated reporting rate is used instead.  
 
Statistical analyses may not yield an accurate understanding of how an ETS impacts the building sector. The first reason is that the 
sample size is too small to derive a statistically significant result. Second, the sources of compliance rates—one of the only two 
quantitative variables relevant and available to this study—are inconsistent across the trading systems. Tokyo’s compliance rate is 
estimated only and the reporting rate is used, which does not include facilities that reported their compliance performance after the 
deadlines and does not equate the compliance rate. In addition, the California data is available only through 2014, which implies that it 
does not track the commercial and residential sectors’ compliance (since they joined the ETS starting 2015) and there could be a  




sizable change to the data composition and the extent of the building sector’s participation due to 
program changes. The third reason is that very limited building-specific trade data is available. 
All compliance rates are calculated based on the total number of regulated facilities or entities—
California’s ETS is the only trading scheme that publishes compliance data for individual 
facilities or entities. Therefore, statistical inferences cannot be drawn from the limited dataset. 
Simple calculations, however, can still be done to demonstrate whether the building sector has 
been able to meet reduction targets through emissions trading. While compliance data for 
individual entities or facilities is not available, a worst-case compliance rate for the building 
sector can be calculated assuming a maximum number of non-compliant entities from the 
building sector (i.e. either the total number of non-compliant entities or the total number of 
building participants, whichever is smaller). Out of the six ETS analyzed in this paper, the 
estimated number of building participants is known for California, Shenzhen, Shanghai, and 
Tokyo. The maximum non-compliance rates calculate as follows: 
 For California, a 0.1% non-compliance rate translates to less than 0.261 non-compliant 
facilities, which in turn calculates to a maximum 5.2% non-compliance rate for entities 
known to involve buildings. 
 The compliance rate for buildings covered in Shenzhen’s ETS is not available since 
building participants’ compliance status is not incorporated into the overall compliance 
rate calculation. 
 An average 100% compliance rate for Shanghai’s ETS implies that all potential entities 
with buildings have met their reduction targets.  
 The overall compliance rate for Tokyo’s ETS mirrors that for buildings only as the vast 
majority of the covered facilities are buildings.  




While it is reasonable to conclude that building participants were largely capable of meeting their 
reduction targets, the extent of self-reduction cannot be inferred from these rates because 
building participants might have purchased allowances or offsets to meet their reduction goals. 
Conversely, participants are not required to disclose the means of compliance, which could 
imply that self-reduction is not tracked or reported. Without additional quantitative data, it is 
challenging to prove that emissions trading is capable of driving building energy efficiency. 
Since most of the pilot ETSs in China directly regulate facilities just like Tokyo’s ETS, however, 
we can gauge interest in self-reduction versus allowance purchase by analyzing carbon prices. 
Below is a summary of allowance and CCER prices for the four pilots: 
Pilot 2015 Avg. 
Allowance Price 




2015 CCER Trading 
Volume (tCO2) 
Beijing ￥46.69/tCO2 3.16MM ￥21.53/tCO2 5.12MM 
Shanghai* ￥10-30/tCO2 2.94MM ￥10-18/tCO2 25.4MM 
Shenzhen ￥69.11/tCO2 4.80MM (estimate) N/A 1.62MM (estimate) 
Tianjin ￥12.3-25.2/tCO2 1.05MM (estimate) N/A 1.15MM (estimate) 
Sources: (1) China Beijing Environment Exchange, ’16; (2) SEEE, ’16; & (3) Tianjin Climate Exchange, ’16. 
*Average carbon prices are not available for Shanghai’s and Tianjin’s ETSs. Price ranges are used instead. 
Building retrofit costs vary by technology, region, and type of contract. For EPC projects, the 
average building retrofit cost to date is 1218 RMB per ton of equivalent CO2 reduction, or a 
magnitude of ten greater than carbon prices in emissions trading (China Construction Bank, 2013, 
p. 4). Since purchasing an allowance is much more cost effective than self-reduction through 
retrofits, building participants would lean toward the former, which in turn implies that 
emissions trading might have had a limited impact on driving building energy reductions.  This 
conclusion, however, is based on the assumption that price is the only influence on building 
retrofits and that carbon prices are critical in offsetting building upgrade costs. Neither is 




necessarily true and, as will be discussed in the next section, other political and fiscal stimulants 
exist to incentivize emission reductions in the building sector.  
While the extent of emissions trading’s impact on building energy reductions cannot be 
determined, specific program features can be improved to enhance the impact of emissions 
trading on building energy consumption. Several types of building participation in ETS have 
surfaced during the analysis—indirect regulation of buildings at the source level, direct 
regulation of facilities, voluntary participation in ETS through offset projects, and other types of 
voluntary participation. The next section of the study will further evaluate ETS design or related 
policies that can enhance the impact of each of the four means of driving building energy 
efficiency through ETS.  
  




V. Results & Discussions 
ETS Program Design for Indirect Regulation of Buildings 
The pilot ETSs in China have only experimented with direct regulation of buildings. Since the 
compliance rate has been high, they will likely continue with direct regulation of buildings 
instead of switching to pure indirect regulation. A more pertinent question is how to avoid 
double counting of emissions as a regional or national ETS incorporates a more diverse range of 
entities in the near future. The four pilot programs currently use different and sometimes mixed 
points of regulation. For example, while the Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen programs 
primarily regulate facilities and businesses, the Tianjin program covers electricity and heat 
production besides facilities (Shen et al, 2014, p. 564). Regulating both emitters and end users 
can result in double counting of emissions, excessive allowance supply, and increased cost of 
regulation (Shen et al, 2014, p. 569). Nonetheless, the risk of double counting can be controlled 
when allowances are determined from energy intensity-based reduction. While it is true that the 
energy consumed by buildings is the same energy delivered by a utility, energy intensity 
reduction in buildings does not necessarily target the same energy as emissions reduction in 
utilities. Specifically, energy intensity reduction in buildings refers to less energy use and 
emissions per square foot. Yet energy intensity reduction in utilities does not necessarily mean 
reducing energy output per power plant. Instead, it can mean using less energy to generate the 
same amount of energy output and reducing energy consumed for energy generation. In other 
words, energy intensity reduction can drive end use energy savings in one sector and input 
energy savings in the other, which do not overlap. Therefore, as long as ETS rules clearly specify 
that emissions under regulation are only based on energy usage that supports an entity’s 
functions (e.g. serving tenants, producing energy, etc.), double counting can be avoided in an 
ETS with diverse sector coverage including indirect regulation of buildings.   




ETS Program Design for Direct Regulation of Buildings 
Several studies of the pilot ETSs—Shenzhen’s ETS in particular—provided suggestions on 
improving ETS program design for direct regulation of buildings. For example, the Shenzhen 
Institute of Building Research conducted an in-depth study of the infrastructure Shenzhen built 
to facilitate the building sector’s participation in emissions trading, which highlighted both 
strengths and weaknesses. Currently, total allowance in Shenzhen’s ETS is calculated by 
multiplying the energy use limits standards by building types with total surface areas and an 
emissions coefficient (Shenzhen Institute of Building Research, 2014, p. 10). The municipal 
government published the Shenzhen Building Energy Consumption Limits Standards for public 
buildings, hospitality industry, and shopping centers, which provide the basis for calculating 
energy use limits standards, or the first component of the formula. Similarly, official documents 
govern the determination of surface areas from which allowance is calculated. Clear 
documentation by the government of assumptions and sources of inputs in the calculation of 
allowance surrender can help improve administrative efficiency and thus lower the cost of 
operating an ETS.  
Certain weaknesses exist in the calculation of the allocation and actual carbon emissions of a 
building. Specifically, Shenzhen’s ETS currently employs a calculation methodology where all 
fuel consumption is converted to equivalent electricity consumption first, and the total equivalent 
electricity use is then multiplied with the emissions coefficient corresponding to electricity 
(Shenzhen Institute of Building Research, 2014, p. 15). This, however, yields a different 
emissions amount than if different fuel consumptions are multiplied by their corresponding 
emissions coefficients and then summed.  These two calculation methods would yield different 
amounts of allowance, which can create potential controversies regarding whether a facility’s 




current emissions would be entirely covered by allowance under one of the methods and thus do 
not have to be reduced for compliance.  
Outdated emissions coefficients could be another issue. Munnings’ (2014) stated that using a 
dated default emissions rates over multiple compliance periods can result in over-allocation, 
which in turn reduces the allowance market price and can discourage further energy retrofit 
initiatives in the building sector. 
In addition, the municipal government has chosen a percentage of the covered public buildings 
that would likely fail to meet the building energy efficiency standards during the first phase of 
emissions trading (Shenzhen Institute of Building Research, 2014, p. 16). This percentage plays 
an important role in balancing the supply and demand of allowances from the building sector. 
The higher the percentage, the stricter the implied standards and the higher the likelihood of 
buildings not meeting the standards. A typical result of a stricter standard is an increase in 
demand for allowance in the market and a corresponding increase in allowance prices. The 
current percentage places 157 of the 197 covered facilities at or exceeding the standards, and the 
remaining 40 performing worse than the standards, resulting in about 328,100 tons of allowance 
supply and 225,000 tons of allowance demand within the building sector (Shenzhen Institute of 
Building Research, 2014, p. 16). How Shenzhen plans to adjust this percentage in the near future 
is subject to a range of factors including the economy, existing status of building energy 
consumption, and cost of implementing energy-efficient technologies. It is worth noting, 
however, that the contribution of the building sector to the overall market balance can be limited 
depending on the building sector’s contribution to the total amount of emissions reductions 
required by emissions trading. 




A third weakness highlighted in the report—which is particular to the building sector—relates to 
eligible trading entities on behalf of buildings. Some buildings have clear ownership 
accountability: some are owned by multiple parties, and still others are run but not owned by 
property management firms. Among the 197 public buildings regulated under the Shenzhen ETS, 
27% have single owners, 46% have multiple owners, and the remaining 27% have not registered 
with the City and have no owner identifications (Shenzhen Institute of Building Research, 2014, 
p. 20). Because of these three situations, three types of stakeholders are allowed to trade 
allowances on behalf of buildings: building owners, property management companies, and 
property users, respectively. Clear identification of trading entities proved to be difficult during 
program implementation, especially for buildings with multiple or no identified owners. As a 
result, trading for building participants warrants further considerations as Shenzhen’s ETS plans 
to expand its coverage of the building sector to include additional public buildings and 
residential and commercial properties in subsequent compliance periods.  
Commercial buildings in China are similar to public buildings in that their energy usage is 
typically metered at the building level. Allowance surrender for commercial buildings requires 
clear allocation of compliance responsibilities amongst owners and effective engagement of 
occupants to incentivize energy reductions at the tenant level. Residential buildings, on the other 
hand, present another layer of complexity. Operation of residential buildings in China varies 
drastically by region. For example, in Southern China, individual units of a residential building 
are owned and metered at the unit level. (Source) Each tenant-owned unit also has its own 
HVAC system. In northern China, however, heating—which is in greater demand than cooling—
is commonly provided from a district heating system (Xu et al, 2014, p. 909). Furthermore, a lot 
of the older residential buildings are not metered for their heat consumption (Liu et al, 2014, p. 




899). This presents two challenges. First, infrastructure may be lacking for tenants to track 
changes in their energy consumption levels and corresponding emissions changes for the purpose 
of compliance. Inability to track usage in turn may dampen tenant owners’ motivation or 
eligibility to participate in emissions trading as tenant owners would have little visibility into the 
impact of their energy reduction initiatives.  
Furthermore, it would be difficult to obligate residential buildings to comply with emissions 
reductions for several reasons. Unmetered residential buildings in China create a problem of 
fairness. Metered buildings may get “punished” for having the ability to track their energy usage 
and having to surrender allowances. Second, setting a threshold that defines regulated residential 
buildings’ energy usage could be problematic. Regulating buildings that exceed certain energy 
consumption per unit of floor space might not account for the differences in family sizes; on the 
other hand, setting energy consumption threshold per tenant imposes the question of whether 
individuals are required to comply with certain energy consumption limits. Lastly, given the size 
of the population and the number of residential buildings in China, conducting due diligence on 
all residential units may not be realistic.  
Regardless of the building type, providing sufficient resources to aid building owners in 
participating in allowance trading is a critical step toward successful incorporation of the 
building sector into ETSs. Besides generic guidance documents on official websites, it is 
important for the government to publicize rulings, baseline calculation and compliance review 
procedures, and trading eligibility documents targeting the building sector. Stable trends of 
allowance prices can also boost covered entities’ wiliness to participate in the ETS.  




Undoubtedly, all aspects of program design need to be standardized to establish a national ETS. 
Many existing features such as the three-year or longer compliance periods, clear rulings, and 
severe penalties for non-compliance may be emulated given the relative success of the pilot 
programs in meeting emissions reduction goals. To better target buildings as a sector, however, 
aspects including coverage of building type, methodology for calculating projected emissions 
and thus allowance allocation, trading entities on behalf of buildings, resources for individual 
building owners participating in an ETS, and infrastructural changes to accommodate a fair 
selection of regulated buildings need to be contemplated further. 
Voluntary Participation in ETS through Offset Projects  
Direct inclusion of building emissions in cap-and-trade programs is one option to drive building 
efficiency. Offset projects are another means of the building sector’s participation in ETS. Offset 
credits can come from three sources: Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), Voluntary Emission 
Reductions (VERs), and Chinese Certified Emission Reductions (CCERs). CERs are a product 
of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, implemented under the Kyoto Protocol in 
developing nations with funding from developed nations to generate offset credits in return 
(Bugnion, 2015, p. 11). VERs are used in voluntary offset markets. Offset project types are 
common across the mechanisms and typically include renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
greenhouse gas (e.g. HFC and N2O) capture, waste reduction and management, and afforestation 
and reforestation. When the pilot ETS went into effect in 2012, credits from all eligible offset 
projects were normalized to CCERs. A total of 88 CCER projects were completed as of 
November 2014. Very few of them, however, occurred in the building sector (Zhou et al, 2014, p. 
4).  




This mirrors the small contribution of building-related CDM projects to the global CDM project 
portfolio. A study found that the reliability of energy consumption data is a major roadblock to 
the adaptation of CCER projects for building efficiency improvements (Zhou et al, 2014, p. 16). 
For example, similarly sized office buildings in Beijing exhibit an extensively wide range of 
electricity consumption per square foot where the largest energy intensity is close to ten times 
the smallest. Such a gap increases the difficulty of benchmarking and setting standard emissions 
levels for a building type, which is necessary for calculating offset credits from CCER projects. 
Another potential challenge lies in the discrepancy of building efficiencies between the design 
and implementation phases of new construction or major renovation of buildings. A study by the 
MOHURD in 2005 of 3,000 ongoing construction projects found that while 80-90% of energy-
efficient building design met the standards in northern China, only 50% executed these standards 
during implementation, 15% of which were put in active use (Zhou et al, 2014, p. 16). This 
phenomenon can be avoided if CCERs are issued after verification, but the inconsistency 
between design and implementation can hamper CCERs’ impact in emissions trading. These two 
factors illustrate potential deficiencies in infrastructure and execution that may affect the 
feasibility of both offset projects and direct regulation of the building sector in emissions trading.  
Lack of incentives to participate in ETSs is another cause for the relative ineffectiveness of offset 
projects in the building sector. For existing buildings, building retrofits is the primary way of 
attaining emission reductions. The cost of building retrofits, however, is relatively high per 
equivalent unit of CO2 reduction compared to other sources of emission reductions (Chen et al, 
2015, p. 132). “Low-hanging fruits” such as lighting retrofits and limited HVAC upgrades can 
achieve sizable savings at relatively low costs. Further upgrades required to achieve deeper 
emission cuts may cover a wide range of technologies and building systems such as the building 




envelope, the broader HVAC system (e.g., chillers, boilers, air handling units, etc.), and controls 
upgrades, which can result in limited incremental savings at higher incremental costs and thus 
worsened project payback and attractiveness. If the total cost of reducing a ton of CO2 equivalent 
through building retrofits and registering it through CCER exceeds the prevailing CCER price, 
CCER projects for buildings may not materialize without substantial subsidies. Another factor 
that dampens interests in CCER building projects is the difficulty and associated cost of 
coordinating with relevant stakeholders, especially for residential buildings. 
Currently, CCER building projects are not the most viable attempt to address building energy 
efficiency. An essential element that needs to be addressed is the prohibitive cost of CCER 
project implementation. That said, a potential cost-effective mechanism exists that can 
essentially substitute itself for CCERs. As discussed earlier, Beijing allows emission reductions 
from energy performance contracts (EPCs) to count toward the 5% CCERs toward compliance. 
The EPC mechanism can be explored further for alleviating the high upfront cost phenomenon 
that building retrofits may encounter.  
Voluntary Participation in ETS through EPCs 
Another form of voluntary participation is demonstrated by Tianjin’s ETS. Energy Performance 
Contracts (EPCs) are a contract vehicle that China adopted from Western countries in the early 
2000s. EPCs represent an innovative financing mechanism for energy efficiency retrofits where 
investment costs of a retrofit project are recovered from the life cycle utility cost savings it 
achieves (Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Unknown, p. 1). Under this model, 
building owners, energy service companies (ESCOs), and third-party financiers work together to 
achieve project success. ESCOs are responsible for designing and implementing an EPC, and 
financiers provide the upfront capital. More importantly, the performance aspect of an EPC lies 




in the savings performance guarantee provided by ESCOs. In the case of a savings shortfall, 
ESCOs are responsible for rectifying the issues or make up the savings shortfall.   
Between 2005 and 2012, EPC investment increased from 1.3 billion yuan to 55.3 billion yuan 
and has achieved an equivalent CO2 reduction of 46 million tons (China Construction Bank, 
2013, p. 4). The EPC model successfully addresses three common obstacles to building retrofits. 
The first obvious advantage is its ability to attract capital using the assurance of savings 
guarantee, thus overcoming the prohibitive cost of project development. Building owners 
welcome the savings guarantee concept and are more committed to project success. Lastly, the 
EPC model effectively leverages the capabilities and knowledge of energy efficiency 
professionals to implement comprehensive building retrofits and thus achieve significant energy 
savings. As a result, an expansion of the EPC application in China may be beneficial. 
It is possible to find synergy between emissions trading and EPC projects for enhancing building 
efficiency. To drive long-term impact from emissions trading, reduction goals beyond 2020 will 
be needed. Such reduction goals in turn require further energy reductions in buildings, which 
could require involvement of more complex building upgrades at higher costs. Allowance prices 
might not increase in response to the rise of unit cost of building retrofits. The resulting gap can 
be filled by EPCs. In addition, the government has set aside fiscal incentives for EPCs (China 
Construction Bank, 2013, p. 5). In fact, the MOHURD and the Ministry of Finance allocated 1.7 
billion yuan for fiscal incentives, only 18.4% of which were utilized (or 312 million yuan). As a 
result, coupling emissions trading and EPCs can also help enhance the utilization of existing 
resources for EPCs and further improve building retrofit economics, which in turn motivate self-
reduction by building participants.  





Based on compliance results to date, the current design of emissions trading seems capable of 
engaging the building sector in energy reductions. The building sector also appears to be a good 
candidate for emissions trading in China given its steadily rising energy consumption and rapid 
urbanization, its relative resistance to fluctuations in external factors such as the economy, and 
the absence of carbon leakage risk in this sector. Key ETS features including a moderately long 
compliance period, a focus on reduction of energy intensity rather than overall emissions, and 
severe penalties for non-compliance may contribute to the ETS’s impact on the building sector. 
Future success of the ETS, however, depends on a few factors. First, a solution needs to be 
identified to engage buildings with unclear ownership structure or no registered ownership. The 
same goes for residential buildings given the inconsistent metering infrastructure across regions 
in China. If ETSs prove not to be the most effective mechanism to engage certain building types, 
alternative mechanisms should be used to encourage or enforce their energy efficiencies.  
Another aspect is the type of emissions accounted for by emissions trading. Certain pilot ETSs 
account for both direct and indirect emissions by buildings, or direct energy usage and the energy 
consumed at the source of generation (e.g. power plants) to deliver energy to building end users. 
Shenzhen’s ETS, for example, incorporates both direct and indirect emissions into its calculation 
of the emissions coefficient, which is in turn used to calculate allowance surrender (Shenzhen 
Institute of Building Research, 2014, p. 11). This is not necessarily the case for other pilot ETSs 
and needs to be unified for the establishment of a national ETS. If both direct and indirect 
emissions are accounted for at the building level, the government needs to clarify which portion 
of energy reductions is targeted at the source level (e.g. energy consumption for energy 
generation by power plants) to avoid double counting of emissions and thus over-allocation of 




allowances at the source level. More importantly, energy use regulated by emissions trading is 
limited to that during the operational phase of a building. This, however, accounts for only half 
of the total energy consumption of a building, and urban buildings tend to consume more energy 
than expected due to a high demolition rate. The current lifespan of urban buildings in China is 
approximately 30 years (Huang et al, 2013, p. 92). If a building that has fulfilled its reduction 
targets through ETS is demolished, its successor—a new building—would consume additional 
energy during construction. If the demolition rate in China cannot be reduced, it may be more 
accurate to calculate allowance surrender based on the lifecycle emissions of a building 
including both the construction and operational phases. Doing so would require a corresponding 
update in allowance calculation methodologies. 
Emissions trading’s impact can be amplified over time and when coupled with other mechanisms. 
The current impact of carbon prices on driving building retrofits is unclear. As deeper retrofits 
are required to achieve future emissions reduction goals, however, allowance surrender can 
become more expensive, and hence higher carbon prices could play a more critical role in 
offsetting the initial costs of building upgrades. Strategies for improving buildings’ efficiency, 
such as emissions trading, CCERs, EPC projects, and demand response work best when 
synchronized with the appropriate stage of a building’s lifecycle. For example, minimizing 
emissions before buildings become an emissions source—that is, targeting building design 
standards for new construction—is likely more cost-effective than attempting to target new 
construction through ETS. Considering the relatively high new construction rate in the near 
future in China, enforcing rigorous design standards and overseeing compliance with these 
standards can certainly complement the impact of an ETS. Collaboration among different 
initiatives may also enhance the overall investment return and promote greater awareness and 




incentives among end users to participate in government initiatives and drive GHG emission 
reductions.  
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